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ABSTRACT 
 There is a significant delta between the acknowledged probability of potential 
mishaps under the current safety assessment approach derived from Military Standard 
(MIL-STD) 882E, Department of Defense Standard Practice of System Safety, and what 
is observed from actualized mishaps reported for the assault amphibious vehicle (AAV). 
All of the previously investigated AAV mishaps were the result of a chain of events that 
could not be traced back to a single initiating mechanism, which is the approach 
MIL-STD-882E uses. This thesis sets out to determine the core elements of a risk-based 
safety assessment method that is most suitable for the AAV. By decomposing actual 
mishap reports, we identified common failure modes that were not adequately assessed 
under the current process. We then applied a probabilistic risk assessment approach and a 
supporting human reliability assessment to the mishap reports. This method, and the 
subsequent probabilistic risk assessment of these mishaps, suggests a greater probability 
of the unwanted event of an AAV sinking than previously acknowledged. The framework 
outlined in this paper has the ability to provide a more accurate and quantifiable risk 
assessment. 
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The risks associated with the equipment provided to the warfighter is often 
articulated and acknowledged differently from the risks realized during its operation. 
Military Standard (MIL-STD) 882E, the Department of Defense Standard Practice of 
System Safety, is the standard methodology utilized for assessing the safety of the systems 
that are provided to the warfighter. MIL-STD-882E (Department of Defense 2012) details 
the process for the identification, assessment, and mitigation of risks associated with the 
development, test, production, use, and disposal of the system. The MIL-STD is a 
simplistic approach that focuses on single-point system failures. Its application during the 
design phase works well in identifying catastrophic single-point failures that are often 
designed out or substantially mitigated to reduce the probability of occurrence. The direct 
causative relationship between a mishap and the single-point failure mechanism generally 
guides systems engineers to design a system that has a very low probability of occurrence 
of single-point failures. 
The research presented here analyzes real-world assault amphibious vehicle (AAV) 
mishaps to identify conditions, factors, root causes, and trends that lead to mishaps, which 
then informs the development of a risk-based method that is better suited to identify 
potential mishaps and determine the probability of occurrence for the mishaps with respect 
to the AAV. The goal of the research presented in this thesis is to develop a risk-informed 
safety method that more accurately captures the comprehensive risk to AAV crews during 
operation of the system. 
This thesis focuses on four reported mishaps resulting in AAV sinkings. Each 
mishap is decomposed to the basic chain of events that led to the sinking. Several 
conditions that are common across the four mishaps are identified. These conditions 
generally shared the same casual factors including:  
• poor quality control during maintenance operations 
• failure to conduct pre-operations check/pre-water operations check 
 xvi 
Both of the above listed conditions share a common human related cause – a human 
error or human violation of established policy and procedures. Human error can be further 
characterized as either skill-based, judgement, or misperception.  Assault amphibious 
vehicle operations rely heavily on policy and procedures to mitigate known hazards, but 
existing AAV safety analysis does not acknowledge human error, policy, or protocol 
violation as a mishap triggering mechanism. Additionally, each of the identified hazards is 
treated as independent events while most mishap reports indicate a common cause 
relationship between multiple human-initiated mishaps. Existing MIL-STD-882E safety 
analysis of the AAV does not recognize the relationship or dependency between one human 
error or violation occurring and subsequent human errors or violations leading to a mishap. 
This thesis proposes a method for legacy system managers to close the gap between 
the risks that are formally identified through methods such as MIL-STD-882E and mishaps 
that occur during system operation. Mishap scenario models built by dissecting the system 
mishap reports are a core component of the proposed method presented herein. However, 
it is the belief of the author that the method may be applicable anywhere in the system 
design process as long as there is sufficient data to construct applicable mishap scenario 
models. For example, operational concepts, architectural views, and historical data on 
similar in-service systems may be utilized to develop preliminary mishap scenario models 
for a system that is in development. The fidelity of preliminary mishap scenario models is 
expected to increase as the system architecture is defined and the system baseline is 
developed, thus allowing the method to be applied through the design phase in an effort to 
refine the resulting risk analysis. 
The results from the proposed method on the AAV mishaps provide a quantitative 
assessment of the chain of events that are specific to the operation of the as-produced and 
as-operated AAV that were not previously captured or acknowledged in official safety 
analysis of the AAV. Table 1 presents the probability of each investigated mishap with 
respect to the outcome of an unwanted sinking event of an AAV. Please note that while the 
analysis presented in this thesis is realistic, no conclusions should be drawn from the 
analysis for the purposes of AAV operations. 
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Table 1. Mishap Probability Summary 
Mishap Probability MIL-STD-882E Probability Category 
#1 9.15E-02 B 
#2 2.6472E-06 D 
#3 2.09952E-06 D 
#4 3.02E-04 D 
 
By assuming the calculated probabilities shown in Table 1 are within the acceptable 
order of magnitude and the severity of the mishap is catastrophic based on the credible 
consequence of loss of life for mishaps related to sinking of a vehicle, the mishap risks 
identified in Table 1 are categorized as 1B, 1D, 1D, and 1D, respectively, per MIL-STD-
882E. These risks can then in turn be put in the weighted organizational matrix based on 
value of the capability provided by the system as currently designed, the probability and 
severity of a mishap occurring, and the cost of fixing or mitigating the risk.   
The decomposition of realized mishaps and the subsequent probabilistic risk 
assessment and human reliability analysis of the analyzed mishaps suggest a greater 
probability of the unwanted event of an AAV sinking than previously acknowledged. 
Additionally, if the newly identified risks are deemed unacceptable, this quantitative 
assessment has identified high-risk events on which AAV program managers and systems 
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The risks formally associated with the equipment provided to the warfighter are 
often articulated and acknowledged differently from the risks realized during its operation. 
Military Standard (MIL-STD) 882E, Department of Defense Standard Practice of System 
Safety (Department of Defense [DoD] 2012), is the standard methodology utilized for 
assessing the safety of the systems that are provided to the warfighter. MIL-STD-882E 
details the process for the identification, assessment, and mitigation of risks associated with 
the development, test, production, use, and disposal of a system. MIL-STD-882E focuses 
on single-failure events but does not generally include failure modes that require sequential 
failure events to occur. The application of MIL-STD-882E during the design phase of the 
systems engineering process works well for identifying catastrophic single-point failures 
that are then often designed out or substantially mitigated to reduce the probability of 
occurrence. The direct causative relationship between a mishap and the single-point failure 
mechanism generally guides systems engineers to design a system that has a very low 
probability of occurrence of single-point failures. In this situation, the calculated 
probability of a mishap occurring using the MIL-STD-882E is much lower than what is 
observed in the field. 
For example, consider the assault amphibious vehicle (AAV). Despite several 
AAVs having sunk in the past, all identified risks relating to the sinking of the AAV are 
currently assessed as medium (1E) risks in accordance with MIL-STD-882E (AAV, 
unpublished data, March 18, 2016). Medium 1E risk means catastrophic severity with a 
probability of improbable. However, based on AAV mishaps that have occurred, there is 
an argument to reassess the probability of occurrence of mishaps. The discrepancy between 
the risk identified in MIL-STD-882E and the observed risk is a result of MIL-STD-882E 
not taking into account failure modes that require sequential failure events to occur. The 
AAV mishaps reviewed as part of this thesis are all the result of a chain of events that 
cannot not be traced back to a single-point failure. 
The purpose of this research is to analyze real-world AAV mishaps to identify 
conditions, factors, root causes, and trends that lead to the mishaps, which then informs the 
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development of a risk-based method that is better suited for assessing risk for the AAV. 
Once a core understanding of why the mishaps occur and why they are not well represented 
in existing MIL-STD-882E safety analyses, this research analyzes existing risk assessment 
methods for their applicability in identifying and quantifying mishaps that otherwise would 
be missed in formal safety analysis. The decomposition of the AAV mishaps included in 
this thesis does not to divulge specific information on individual incidents, but rather is 
used to identify generalized trends and causes that are useful to this research. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There is a significant difference between the acknowledged probability of potential 
mishaps under the current safety assessment approach and what is observed from 
actualized mishaps reported. MIL-STD-882E focuses on single-point failures but does not 
generally include failure modes that require sequential failure events to occur. The 
application of MIL-STD-882E during the design phase of the systems engineering process 
works well in identifying catastrophic single-point failures that are then often designed out 
or substantially mitigated to reduce the probability of occurrence. The direct causative 
relationship between a mishap and the single-point failure mechanism generally guides 
systems engineers to design a system that has a very low probability of occurrence of 
single-point failures. However, the culmination of several failures as reported in mishap 
reports are often ignored. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the core elements of a risk-based safety assessment method that are most 
suitable for an AAV? 
C. SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
The “DoD requires program offices to support system related mishap investigations 
by providing analyses of the hazards that contributed to the mishap” (DoD 2012, 14). 
However, a much greater understanding of the system and its failure modes can be obtained 
by analyzing the mishap report directly. The mishap reports provide a level of detail 
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regarding the relationship between the operator, the system, and the operating environment 
that the systems engineer may not be aware of or understand. There is an opportunity to 
establish a method for breaking down such mishap reports to identify relevant system 
information to quantify the probability of mishaps that have already been observed to occur 
again in the future. Through a methodical analysis of mishap reports, program managers 
and users will be better informed of the current risks of their systems as designed and 
operated. Additionally, it may be possible to identify high-risk events in advance thus 
allowing engineers to focus resources in support of improving safety. 
  
 4 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review in this section provides relevant background on current risk 
assessment methodologies to identify what are the core elements of a risk-based method 
that are most suitable for an AAV. The objective is to identify core elements of risk-based 
methods and apply a method for breaking down mishap reports to quantify the probability 
of the actualized mishaps. This thesis proposes a method for legacy system managers to 
close the gap between the risks that are formally identified through methods such as MIL-
STD-882E and mishaps that occur during system operation. Through a methodical analysis 
of mishap reports, program managers and users will be better informed of the current risks 
of their systems as designed and operated. Additionally, it may be possible to identify high-
risk events in advance thus allowing engineers to focus resources in support of improving 
safety. 
A. DEFINING TERMS 
MIL-STD-882E (DoD 2012) defines the terms below as follows: 
• Mishap: “A mishap is the event resulting in unintentional death, injury, 
damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the 
environment” (6). 
• Hazard: “A hazard is the condition that leads to the event” (5). 
• Causal factor. “A causal factor is the mechanism that triggers the hazard” 
(4). 
MIL-STD-882E presents a singular linear relationship between the mechanism that 
triggers a hazard and the resulting mishap. However, in all of the mishap reports reviewed 
as part of this research, there are no single-point failures. In all cases, multiple failures 
occurred to cause the mishap. In practice, it appears that mishaps are much more dynamic; 
two or more failure events contribute to a mishap occurring. In an effort to move beyond 
the single-point failure analysis language found in MIL-STD-882E, the author proposes 
using the following definitions which will be used for the remainder of this thesis: 
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• Mishap: A mishap is defined as the sequence of hazards that must occur 
for a system to be in a failed state. In the context of this research, a failed 
state is defined as the system of interest being sunk or damaged beyond 
immediate repair and/or the loss of life. 
• Hazard: The hazard is defined as the failure event or events that 
contributed to the mishap. 
• Causal factor: The causal factor is the initiating event that triggers the 
hazard(s) that leads to the mishap occurring. 
B. REVIEW OF EXISTING RISK AND SAFETY METHODOLOGIES 
The methodology that the DoD uses is MIL-STD-882E which is structured 
specifically for assessing “the severity category and probability level of the potential 
mishap(s) for each hazard across all of the system modes” (DoD 2012, 10) using the 
severity and probability definitions found in the standard. From analysis of the available 
AAV mishap reports (see Chapter III for a detailed analysis of mishap reports), it can be 
surmised that the mishaps are not the result of a single realized hazard, but rather from a 
series of hazards initiated by a causal factor. The series of hazards and causal factor 
generally are a combination of hardware failures and human failures. Additionally, in most 
cases the hardware failure may also be linked to a human failure.  
Ideally a risk assessment should include a technique to model the entire operational 
phase of a system that accounts for hazards and causal factors including both human failure 
events hardware failure events, and can examine mishaps that require sequential failure 
events and causal factors to be present in order for the mishap to occur. This section reviews 
several pertinent existing methodologies and their applicability to mishaps that are caused 
by sequential failure events and causal factors. The following paragraphs include an 
analysis of key attributes and deficiencies of existing methodologies. 
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1. Subsystem Hazard Analysis (MIL-STD-882E) 
The subsystem hazard analysis (SSHA) in MIL-STD-882E is a potential technique 
for capturing some of the human reliability issues. The purpose of the SSHA, per 
MIL-STD-882E, is to “identify hazards associated with the design of the subsystem, and 
the human is considered a component within a subsystem, receiving both inputs and 
outputs” (DoD 2012, 51). A main objective of this analysis is to “determine modes of 
failure, including component failure modes and human errors, single-point and common 
mode failures, the effects when failures occur in subsystem components, and from 
functional relationships between components and equipment comprising each subsystem” 
(DoD 2012, 51). However, MIL-STD-882E does not call out a specific type of analysis to 
accomplish this task; the standard only states that the results shall “be captured in the 
hazard tracking system (HTS)” (52). The HTS only presents a singular linear relationship 
between the causal factors, hazards, and mishaps, per MIL-STD-882E. As a result, a 
mishap that consists of sequential failure events and causal factors cannot be accounted for 
using SSHA. 
2. System Hazard Analysis (MIL-STD-882E) 
The system hazard analysis (SHA) is also described in MIL-STD-882E where it is 
stated that the SHA shall “identify hazards and mitigation measures in the integrated 
system design, including software and subsystem and human interfaces” (DoD 2012, 54). 
Additionally, MIL-STD-882E states that the SHA shall identify “possible independent, 
dependent, and simultaneous events, including system failures, failures of safety devices, 
common cause failures, and system interactions that could create a hazard or result in an 
increase in risk” (54). However, the standard does not specify an analysis method to 
accomplish this task; it only states that the results shall “be captured in the HTS” (55). The 
structure of the HTS does not allow for the identification of dependent causal factors 
leading to a potential mishap, thus making SHA not particularly useful for situations where 
sequential failure events and causal factors must occur to result in a specific mishap. 
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3. Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (MIL-STD-882E) 
The operating and support hazard analysis (O&SHA) found in MIL-STD-882E is 
intended to “identify and assess hazards introduced by operational and support activities” 
(DoD 2012, 57). Similar to the SSHA, the O&SHA states that “the human shall be 
considered an element of the total system” (DoD 2012, 57). However, the O&SHA also 
inherits all the other deficiencies that are found and are discussed above the SSHA and 
SHA. MIL-STD-882E does not specify a technique to accomplish O&SHA, and results are 
reported in the HTS in the same way that results are presented in SSHA and SHA. 
4. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis / Failure Mode Effects, and 
Criticality Analysis  
The failure mode effects and analysis (FMEA) and the failure mode, effects and 
criticality analysis (FMECA) are bottom up evaluation techniques that focus on the design 
and function of a system (Ericson 2005). “The purpose of FMEA/FMECA is to evaluate 
the effect of failure modes to determine if a design change is necessary due to unacceptable 
reliability, safety, or operation” (Ericson 2005, 236). FMEA/FMECA is generally 
performed by listing out the components of the system, then identifying failure modes, 
failure rates, immediate effects, and system effects for each component. However, 
FMEA/FMECA is poor at identifying failure modes that require multiple components to 
fail or failure modes that include both hardware component failures and human failures 
(Ericson 2005). While FMEA/FMECA excels at considering single-point failures, 
FMEA/FMECA is not a satisfactory tool for analyzing failure modes that are caused by 
multiple failure events. 
5. Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a top-down method for identifying causative paths from 
a failure event to all possible root causes (Ericson 2005). FTA is useful in that if done 
correctly, FTA can model a combination of casual factors or basic events that can cause a 
failure event to occur and provide a quantifiable probability of occurrence of the failure 
event. However, there is a limitation in theory since the goal of the FTA is to identify the 
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probability of occurrence of a specified failure event. Subsequent failure events not 
identified or associated with the specified failure event may be neglected. 
6. Event Tree Analysis 
Event tree analysis (ETA) is used to identify and evaluate all possible paths from 
an initiating event to either an acceptable system state or a failed system state. Many 
different outcome paths from a single initiating event can be identified and the probability 
of occurrence can be determined for each outcome. ETA can be limited if an analyst needs 
to evaluate the consequences of multiple initiating events, as a single ETA is limited to one 
initiating event or one group of similar initiating events. However, this limitation is 
mitigated by conducting multiple ETAs and combining their results as necessary. 
7. Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
As described in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA 
Managers and Practitioners, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a “comprehensive, 
structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex 
technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and 
performance” (Stamatelatos 2011, 1-1). PRA is a logic-based modeling approach 
constructed using sets of scenarios, frequencies of occurrence, and consequences. PRA is 
an extension of the FTA and ETA methods discussed above. A PRA identifies an initiating 
event and one or more top-level events that lead to a predicted end state using the ETA 
methodology. The initiating event requires some type of required response from the 
system, subsystem, or operator. The response is the top-level event. The top-level event 
has a success or failure probability based on its response to the initiating event or preceding 
event. This allows for the calculation of probability of success or failure at the top-level 
events and through to the various end states. The PRA is not limited in the number of 
initiating events or any dependency among initiating events. The top-level events generally 
connect to FTAs where basic events are mapped to calculate probabilities of specific 
sequences of basic events occurring which results in the failure of the top-level event in 
the event tree. The PRA has the ability to support a comprehensive view of the various end 
states as derived from the various sequence of basic events. 
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It is difficult to fully assess the safety of a system’s design without considering the 
reliability of the human within the system. The PRA forces the analyst to incorporate 
human involvement at the relevant top-level events that require a response from the 
operator. Quantifying the reliability of the human within the system is a potential challenge. 
However, human reliability analysis (HRA) is often incorporated within a PRA to address 
such issues (Stamatelatos 2011). There are numerous HRA modeling approaches such as, 
THERP, HEART, HEARTH, SPAR-H and CREAM, each with its own technique or 
guidance for quantifying human error probability for specific human actions or events. 
HRA models often focus on a specific type of human systems integration and associated 
task descriptions. Assessing and identifying suitable HRA models that support PRA adds 
another layer of complexity in conducting a complete and valid PRA. 
C. DESIRED ATTRIBUTES  
The ideal safety assessment method for the AAV shall be a comprehensive analysis 
method focused on identifying and assessing the probability of a mishap that has either 
occurred or could be predicted to occur. The method shall be able to model the hardware, 
software, and human dependencies within the entire system. Single failure events and 
sequential failure events shall be identified, assessed, and recorded. The goal of the method 
is to support a risk-informed safety case that more accurately captures the sequential and 
parallel failure event pathways that are observed in the operation of the system. Table 1 
illustrates the correlation between the desired characteristics and the methodologies. 












SSHA  X   
SHA  X   
O&SHA  X   
FMEA/FMECA  X   
FTA X X X  
ETA X X X  
PRA X X X X 
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D. RELATED RESEARCH 
Industry has long embraced the benefit of performing a PRA in the development of 
certain products or procedures such as nuclear power plants, aircraft, spacecraft, and 
automobiles/passenger vehicles. There is an abundance of literature on PRA specific to 
various products and procedures from automobiles to medical procedures. Subsequently, 
research into human reliability analysis has also grown. Specific HRA techniques have 
been developed to further quantify and increase the accuracy of specific PRA models. For 
example, “Human Error Probability Estimation for Process Risk Assessment with 
Emphasis on Control Room Operations” (Nespoli and Sabatino 2010), “Application of the 
CARA HRA Tool to Air Traffic Management Safety Cases” (Gibson and Kirwan 2008), 
“Human Error Probability Assessment During Maintenance Activities of Marine Systems” 
(Islam et al. 2018) leveraged existing HRA techniques such as, Technique for Human Error 
Rate Prediction (THERP), Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM), 
Nuclear Action Reliability Assessment (NARA), and Standard Plant Analysis Risk HRA 
Method (SPAR-H ) to model the human reliability within their systems. 
Mishap analysis research is often centered on the human component of the system.   
For example, “Simulation and Analysis of Class A and B Flight Mishaps with an 
Assessment of Human Factors Intervention” (Jensen 1999) and “A Human Systems 
Integration Perspective to Evaluating Naval Aviation Mishaps and Developing 
Intervention Strategies” (Cowan 2009) both analyze mishap reports. However, their focus 
is the evaluation of the human casual factors and identification of related HRA techniques. 
Such research is beyond the scope of this paper as substantial resources and time would be 
required to specifically tailor an existing HRA technique to the AAV operations.  
In summary, while many methods exist in the literature that may be useful in 
specific situations, a holistic method applicable to analyzing AAV mishaps does not 
currently exist. Of the methods that do exist, the primary focus on aspects of human 
reliability other than probability of mishaps. As a result, this research focuses on the 
quantification of mishap probability for AAV operations. 
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E. SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGIES 
The current safety assessment state of practice for the AAV is largely influenced 
by MIL-STD-882E. There are analyses, such as the SHA and O&SHA, referenced within 
MIL-STD-882E that in theory could be executed in a comprehensive, structured, and 
logical method if preformed using the FTA or ETA methods, but the reporting structure of 
the HTS restricts the assessment to a single linear relation between a hazard and a mishap. 
The MIL-STD-882E structure for identifying and tracking risks within the HTS focuses on 
single hazards that lead to mishaps which negates the usefulness of more comprehensive, 
structured, and logical methods in association with HTS and MIL-STD-882E. To support 
the communication of the results of a more comprehensive analysis, the HTS will need to 
be restructured. FTA and ETA have their own deficiencies as previously identified that 
prevent them from being an all-inclusive method. PRA shows the most potential in 
correcting the deficiency between the acknowledged risk and the actual risk found in 
current safety analyses of the AAV. Thus, there is motivation to develop a PRA-based 
method specific to the operational scenarios of the AAV system and decomposed AAV 
mishap reports that may help program managers and system designers to better understand 
and improve the safety of the AAV, and further may provide a method that can be used 
during the design of a replacement for the AAV (or similar systems) to avoid some of the 
mishaps that have occurred with the AAV. A PRA-based method may provide program 
managers and other stakeholders with a method that better informs stakeholders of the 
current risks of systems as designed and operated. Additionally, high-risk events may be 
identifiable in advance of a mishap, thus allowing engineers to focus resources in support 
of improving system safety. 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
All of the AAV mishaps investigated as part of this research are found to be the 
result of a chain of events that cannot not be traced back to a single casual factor. The MIL-
STD-882E safety methodology lacks the ability to identify, assess, and mitigate mishaps 
where more than one hazard or causal factor is needed to realize the mishap. The purpose 
of this research is to analyze real-world AAV mishaps to identify conditions, factors, root 
causes, and trends that lead to the mishaps in an attempt to identify a risk-based method 
that is better suited for the AAV.  
A. AAV OPERATIONS  
Am understanding of AAV operations is necessary to comprehend the sequence of 
events that comprise mishap reports. The AAV is an armored tracked amphibious assault 
landing vehicle that carries troops from ship to shore, through rough water and the surf 
zone, and inland to objectives after the AAV is ashore (USMC 2012). While performing 
water operations, the AAV is partially submerged with approximately 18 inches of the hull 
above the water line.  
The AAV is normally embarked and transported on amphibious warfare ships. The 
most common type of AAV embarkation aboard amphibious ships is conducted by entering 
the water from land and transiting out through the surf zone where the vehicle is put into 
neutral to disable the tracks and water jets are engaged to propel the AAV forward to an 
offshore anchored ship (USMC 2013). The vehicle commander is required to complete a 
standard pre-operation checklist and will ensure the watertight integrity of the AAV before 
entering the water (DoN 2012b). A group of AAVs maintain a designated interval upon 
entering the water and travel in a column to facilitate ease of loading. The lead AAV 
positions off the ship’s stern and awaits the signal to load. Upon notification that the ship 
is ready for embarkation, the AAVs proceed to the ship for loading. The driver places the 
vehicle in first gear to engage tracks before entering the ship and proceeds until tracks 
touch down within the well deck. Embarked personnel remain aboard the AAVs until all 
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the vehicles are embarked and stopped, and authorization to move about the well-deck has 
been given. 
AAVs are launched from the ship and transition to their objective on land in a 
process called debarkation. In this process, the AAVs have already been embarked on to 
the ship and are staged in the well deck. The crew conducts the required pre-water 
operations checks and waits for permission to launch. Once permission is granted, the 
driver places the vehicle in water tracks mode and drives off out of the well deck of the 
ship into the water where it briefly submerges. The typically AAV surfaces uneventfully 
and is transitioned to the objective ashore (USMC 2012). 
B. MISHAPS  
The formal mishap investigative report provides a detailed fact-based chronological 
history of the vehicle and crew. The analysis of the reports allows the identification of the 
contributing conditions and associated causal factors. 
The following are brief descriptions of several relevant mishaps. For practical 
purposes, these mishaps are referred to as mishap #1, #2, #3, and #4. 
1. Mishap #1 
This event occurred during the debarkation portion of an amphibious operation 
(Commanding General Second Marine Division 1994). The AAVs had already embarked 
to the ship and were staged in the well deck. The crew conducted the required pre-water 
operations checks and waited for permission to launch. Once permission was granted, the 
crew launched the vehicle from the well deck and it surfaces uneventfully. The driver 
placed vehicle gear selector in neutral position while accelerator pedal was completely 
depressed and pushed the hand throttle all the way forward and removed his foot from the 
accelerator pedal. The driver unlocked and opened his hatch. The driver turned his body in 
a clockwise direction until facing aft in an attempt to secure his hatch in the open position. 
At this time, the driver experienced difficulty in securing his hatch due to a missing driver’s 
hatch support. Meanwhile, the vehicle commander (VC) and crew chief (CC) were facing 
aft locking their hatches simultaneously with the driver. The VC turned forward and 
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noticed water up to driver’s hatch and warned the driver he is about to get wet. The driver 
turned forward just as water began rushing into driver’s hatch. The driver turned towards 
the CC chief with a look of panic and confusion. The VC and CC attempted to take 
corrective action but were unsuccessful due to the volume of water rushing in through the 
driver’s hatch. The vehicle submerged completely.  
2. Mishap #2 
This event occurred during the embarkation portion of an amphibious operation 
(Bourne 2009). In this mishap, the engine of the vehicle stalled as it approached the stern 
gate of the ship. Immediate attempts by the driver to restart the vehicle failed. The vehicle 
rotated and floated partially into the well deck. Over the next 5–10 minutes, the wave action 
in the well deck moved the vehicle about the well deck. The crew of vehicle reported that 
they felt jarring and impact with the ship. The starboard forward bilge outlet cover 
assembly was torn off of the vehicle unknown to the crew. The vehicle then floated out of 
the well deck. At this point the vehicle had no hydraulic bilge capability due to the stalled 
engine and limited electric bilge capacity, and had no communications due to a discharged 
battery bank. A second vehicle moved in to tow the vehicle. The first attempt to tow the 
vehicle into the well deck was turned away because of the depth of water at the sill of the 
ship was insufficient. The remaining AAVs continued to load while the ship ballasted down 
to increase the depth of the water at the sill. Approximately 35 minutes passed between the 
time the vehicle was rigged for tow and the final recovery attempt. Once the ship ballasted 
to the proper depth, the tow vehicle made its final approach with disabled vehicle in tow. 
The starboard bilge drain of the disabled vehicle submerged as a function of both the 
increased draft from the excess sea water taken on over the previous 35 minutes, and the 
increased pressure on the bow from both wind and seas. The first tow line broke as the tow 
vehicle made contact with the stern gate and the disabled vehicle was simultaneously hit 
with a large wave. The tow vehicle was then pulled backward and slightly down the stern 
gate causing the second towline break. The bow of disabled vehicle continued to rotate 
downward, and within 3–5 seconds the entire vehicle had submerged. 
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3. Mishap #3 
This mishap occurred during a training evolution called basic water training (Strack 
2010). Basic water training familiarizes future AAV crewmen with the water operations of 
the vehicle. Under the supervision of an instructor, students drive the AAV into the water 
and perform a series of maneuvers. In this situation, as the student driver drove the vehicle 
into the ocean nearing the end of the surf zone, the vehicle started to take on water at a 
rapid pace overwhelming the vehicle’s bilge capacity. The vehicle took a nose down angle 
and sank at the edge of the surf zone approximately 2–3 minutes after entering the water. 
4. Mishap #4 
Similar to mishap #3, this mishap occurred during the basic water training evolution 
(Seiffert 2011). In this situation, the student driver drove into the water, and the vehicle 
started floating. The driver was instructed to put the gear selector in neutral and to open his 
hatch. The driver was then instructed to drive straight out and conduct a turn. After the 
turn, the instructor noticed the water rising over the bow of the vehicle and instructed the 
driver to let off the throttle. The driver reported that the throttle pedal was stuck and 
attempted to free the pedal. Meanwhile, the water rose further and started to flow into the 
driver’s hatch. The driver became unresponsive to instructions. The instructor 
unsuccessfully attempted corrective action due to the flow of water into the driver’s hatch. 
The vehicle submerged completely. 
C. MISHAP DECOMPOSITION 
Each of these mishaps is unique in their own way. None of them are as a result of 
single casual factors, but rather each mishap is the result of a series of casual factors 
unfolding over varying periods of time. When reviewing a mishap report, it is often 
challenging to distinguish when chains of events leading to mishaps were originally 
initiated. In an attempt to better understand the factors involved in each of these mishaps, 
a reverse engineering approach is utilized. Starting with the end result of the unwanted 
event and working backwards to identify the different potential factors is proposed as a 
method of better understanding the mishaps. The investigative reports developed in 
accordance with Judge Advocate General Instruction 5800.7F (DoN 2012a), 
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section 0209.d are the primary records utilized to decompose the events that led to the 
mishaps. The formal mishap investigative report provides a detailed fact-based 
chronological history of the vehicle and crew. The details in the mishap investigation report 
are communicated in two forms; findings of facts and opinions. The findings of facts are 
specific facts relevant to times, places, persons, and events leading up to and following the 
event under investigation. The findings of facts are generally related to prior maintenance 
activities (M), pre-operation checks (P), events (E), and recovery (R). The opinions (O) are 
reasonable evaluations, inferences, or conclusions of the investigating officer based on the 
facts found. An in-depth analysis of the formal mishap investigation report allows the 
analyst to identify key elements among the findings and opinions that contributed to the 
mishap.   
The first step in the decomposition of the mishap is the extraction of the relevant 
findings. The relevant findings are limited to system related operations, procedures, 
functions, and conditions. In this context the system includes the vehicle and operator. 
Findings regarding the operator are focused on his or her actions or tasks as they relate to 
the operation of the system. All findings that identify a potential contributing conditions 
and subsequent causal factors to such are noted. These key elements can be organized to 
illustrate a logical flow of cause and effect throughout the buildup of the mishap. 
The sequence of events articulated in the mishap investigation reports in 
comparison with standard operating procedures (SOPs) and pre-operation checklists are 
essential in creating a complete and inclusive mishap decomposition. Deviations from 
SOPs and pre-operation checklists are often captured as findings within mishap reports, 
but not always. A key feature of SOPs and pre-operation checklists is that if a component 
or task is highlighted within, it must be critical to the safe operation of the vehicle. 
The second step involves assessing the investigating officer’s opinions from the 
report and comparing them to the conditions and potential causal factors extrapolated from 
the findings. This comparison validates the identification of conditions and casual factors 
and can potentially reveal a previously dismissed factor. At this point the extraction and 
organization of the findings and opinions resemble a logical sequence of events. All 
conditions contributing to the mishap are noted and potential causal factors have been 
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identified. The detailed decomposition of mishaps #1–4 utilizing the approach described 
above can be found in corresponding appendices at the end of this document. 
A detailed review of a mishap sequence allows for the identification of the potential 
failure events. Subsequent fault trees, as shown below, are constructed linking all the 
origins of the failure event to the casual factor that lead to the mishap. These causal factors 
shall be considered the root causes of the mishap. 
1. Failure event—Larger than normal intake of water  
a. Wave and wind water lapping into the exposed starboard electric bilge outlet 
i. Uncontrolled contact with well deck resulting in damage to starboard 
electrical bilge outlet  
1. Unknown engine stall on stern gate  
2. Inability to restart the engine  
a. Discharged battery bank 
i. Generator failure 
1. Water intrusion from missing bolts 
a. Poor quality control/maintenance 
operations. 
b. Failure to conduct pre-
operations check/pre-water 
operations check. 
2. Failure event—Larger than normal intake of water  
a. The holes from the missing bolts on the plenum housing and cargo hatch 
i. Poor quality control/maintenance operations. 
ii. Failure to conduct pre-operations check/pre-water operations check. 
3. Failure event—Larger than normal intake of water Causal Factor 
a. Exhaust grill and plenum housing not properly secured. 
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i. Poor quality control/maintenance operations. 
ii. Failure to conduct pre-operations check/pre-water operations check. 
4. Failure event—Larger than normal intake of water  
a. Degraded electric bilge capacity  
i. Discharged battery bank 
1. Generator failure 
a. Water intrusion from missing bolts 
i. Poor quality control/maintenance operations. 
ii. Failure to conduct pre-operations check/pre-
water operations check. 
5. Failure event—Larger than normal intake of water  
a. No hydraulic bilge capacity  
i. Unknown engine stall on stern gate  
ii. Inability to restart the engine  
1. Discharged battery bank 
a. Generator failure 
i. Water intrusion from missing bolts 
1. Poor quality control/maintenance 
operations. 
2. Failure to conduct pre-operations 
check/pre-water operations check. 
D. SUMMARY 
The process of decomposing has been repeated for each mishap. The four examined 
mishaps have the same end state: the vehicle submerges/sinks. There are several similar 
 20 
failure events that are also common across the mishaps. These failure events often shared 
the same casual factor origins. For example: 
• poor quality control during maintenance operations 
• failure to conduct pre-operations check/pre-water operations check 
Each of these mishaps shares a common human related casual factor, human error, 
or violation. Human error can be further characterized as either skill-based, judgement, or 
misperception (DoN 2005). The AAV relies heavily on policy and procedures to mitigate 
known hazards but current safety assessment state of practice for the AAV does not 
acknowledge human error or violation as a casual factor. Additionally, each of the 
identified hazards is treated as independent from one another. There is no relation or 
dependency considered between one hazard being realized and its subsequent effect of 
triggering additional conditions. It is the view of the author that the current safety 
assessment state of practice for the AAV is insufficient and a method that supports a 
comprehensive assessment of various end states as derived from the various sequence of 
basic events to include human related causal factors is needed. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
The intent of this research is to identify a method for legacy system managers to 
close the gap between the risks that are formally identified using methods such as MIL-
STD-882E mishaps that occur during system operation. Mishap scenario models built by 
dissecting the system mishap reports are a core component of the method proposed below. 
However, the method could be applied to a system anywhere in the systems engineering 
design process if there is sufficient data to construct applicable mishap scenario models. 
For example, operational concepts, architectural views, and historical data on similar in-
service systems can be utilized to develop preliminary mishap scenario models for a 
developmental system. The fidelity of the mishap scenario models will increase as the 
system architecture is defined and the product baseline is developed, thus allowing the 
method to be applied through the design phase. While this method is adaptable anywhere 
along the design process, the proposed method is developed below as it applies to legacy 
systems, and specifically to the AAV and the associated mishaps previously discussed. 
A. FRAMEWORK 
The proposed method is in Figure 1.
 22 
 
Figure 1.  Mishap Assessment Method
 23 
To illustrate the application of the proposed method to the AAV within the 
previously defined scope of this research, the description of the application of the method 
will be described as only addressing mishap #2. The application of the method to the 
mishap #1, mishap #3, and mishap #4 can be found in each corresponding appendix at the 
end of this document. 
1. Step 1: Data Collection 
The development of mishap scenario models is the core component of this method. 
The fidelity of the developed mishap scenario models is dependent on the quality of the 
documentation collected. Mishap reports, operational checklists, operational tasks, and 
procedures need to be collected. As previously noted, the AAV is currently in service in 
the military. Data collection for in service equipment can lead to information overload. The 
primary focus of the method presented here for the AAV is to quantify the actual risk of 
the system, thus the primary data collection focuses on the mishap report and pre-water 
operations checklists.  
2. Step 2: Mishap Scenario Models 
The decomposition of the collected data is important to this step. Figure 2 illustrates 
a constructed mishap scenario of mishap #2. The mishap scenario development follows the 
mishap report decomposition process described in Section 3.C. This mishap scenario is a 




Figure 2.  Mishap #2 Scenario
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3. Step 3: Identify Failure Modes
The mishap scenario models lay out the events in the mishap report in a logical 
block flow diagram that allows for the identification of the contributing failure events. 
Once the failure modes are identified, corresponding fault trees and event trees should be 
constructed. The fault trees and events trees for this research are constructed in accordance 
with the Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and 
Practitioners (Stamatelatos 2011). For this purpose, failure event shall be defined as the 
event that contributed to the mishap.   
The author suggests that fault trees and event trees be constructed without 
probabilities. The intent is to focus on constructing complete logical fault paths. This is 
useful since the fault trees and event trees will likely be comprised of different 
combinations of the three types of failure events: hardware, software, and human that have 
substantially different means for determining the probability of failure. Computing or 
sourcing the related probabilities is addressed in later steps of the method. Figures 3 
through 7 are the constructed fault trees and event tree for mishap #2.   
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Figure 3.  Maintenance—Plenum Bolts Not Installed FTA 
Figure 4.  Pre-water Ops Check FTA 
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Figure 5.  Vehicle Batteries Discharge FTA 
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Figure 6.  Loss of Bilge Capacity FTA
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Figure 7.  Mishap #2 Event Tree
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4. Step 4.a: Calculate Hardware and Software Probability of Failure 
Distribution 
Calculating the probability of the mishap is dependent on the ability to estimate the 
failure rate of those system components. Hardware and software failure probabilities are 
directly related to their reliability and should be extrapolated from reliability testing or 
documentation. In lieu of actual test data, the minimum reliability requirements for the 
subsystem or components can be utilized. The minimum reliability for the subsystem or 
components can be identified in the system specifications. A standard minimum reliability 
of 0.95 is utilized in this paper to calculate the failure probability of all subsystems and 
components identified. Note that the reliability data in this paper is intentionally not 
accurate AAV data and is for demonstration purposes only.  
5. Step 4.b: Collect or Conduct Human Task Analyst 
Human error probability is challenging to accurately determine. Human error is 
known to vary depending on the task, frequency, and environment (Stamatelatos 2011). 
This research advocates for human task analysis to be conducted in relation to the actions 
or activities required of the operator/maintainers leading to the mishap. This human task 
analysis will assist in identifying an appropriate HRA technique to determine an acceptable 
human error probability for the specific failure. 
As previously stated there are numerous HRA modeling approaches, each with its 
own technique or guidance for quantifying the human error probability. THERP, CREAM, 
SPAR-H, and NARA are examples of acceptable techniques that are applicable to a variety 
of activities. Substantial resources and time would be required to specifically tailor an 
existing technique to the AAV operations, thus for the purposes of this research, the human 
error probabilities will be taken from NARA. NARA uses actual human error data and 
defines a set of generic tasks that can be generalized to match similar activities. For all 
practical purposes human error probability is the same as human unreliability. Table 2 is 
the list of NARA generic tasks utilized in this research. 
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Table 2.   NARA Generic Task List. Source: Kirwan et al. (2005). 









(B) Shift or restore system to a new or original state on a single attempt 




(C) Complex task requiring high level of comprehension and skill 0.16  
(0.12–0.28) 
 
(D) Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given scant attention 0.09  
(0.06–0.13) 
 





(F) Restore or shift a system to original or new state following procedures, 




(G) Completely familiar, well-designed, highly practiced, routine task 
occurring several times per hour, performed to highest possible standards by 
highly motivated, highly trained and experienced personnel, with time to 




(H) Respond correctly to system command even when there is an augmented 





Utilizing NARA generic task human failure probability data is not optimal; 
however, it likely falls within an order of magnitude of reality and therefore is sufficient 
for demonstrating the proposed method. If the proposed method is used for a formal safety 
reassessment of the AAV, it may be useful to develop an HRA that is specifically suited 
for the AAV. For the purposes of this research, tasks such as routine crew checklist (Pre-
ops and Pre-water Ops) and maintenance quality control checklists are identified as 
category (D) with a nominal human failure probability of 0.09 as a baseline. Each 
subsequent level of supervisor unreliability should be doubled if previous level failed. For 
example, the VC is the first level at 0.09. If VC fails, section leader unreliability will be 
0.18. If section leader fails, the Splash Team Leader unreliability will be 0.36. It is useful 
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to note that the third level of supervision is a recent development to address previous 
failures and was not in place at time of the mishaps. For driver tasks, particularly student 
or novice drivers, the task is identified as category (A) with a nominal human failure 
probability of 0.55. Maintenance tasks (first echelon crew tasks and second echelon 
maintainer tasks) are identified as category (c) with a nominal human failure probability 
of .016. 
6. Step 5: Conduct PRA 
Conducting the PRA is basically finishing the previously constructed FTAs and 
ETAs using the probabilities from Step 4. For purposes of this paper, a PRA software tool 
called SAPHIRE was utilized. SAPHIRE was developed by the Idaho National Laboratory 
for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The FTAs and ETAs shown above 
and elsewhere in this document were developed in SAPHIRE which in turn provided 
probability calculations for each cut set. The use of SAPHIRE or a similar software 
package such as CAFTA is recommended to ensure the correctness of the calculations. 
Hand calculations are more prone to errors. Table 3 shows the top two cut sets related to 
mishap #2. A complete cut set for mishap #2 can be found in Appendix E.   
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Table 3.    Mishap #2 Cut Set 
# Cases Prob/Freq Total % Cut Sets  
1 C 1.00E-06 89.03 MISHAP_2: 4   
    1.00E+00   SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
    1.00E-01   ENGINE_STALL Engine stalls 
    1.00E+00   GENERATOR_DISABLED_WATE
R 
Water intrusion disables 
generator. NOTE: This should 
be updated with probability of 
water intrusion for missing bolts 
    1.00E-01   MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
    1.00E-02   OTHER_PLENUM_BOLT_FAILU
R 
Other reasons for plenum bolts 
failing or missing 
    1.00E-01   PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
    1.00E-01   PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
2 C 1.00E-07 8.9 MISHAP_2: 4   
    1.00E+00   SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
    1.00E-03   COLLISION_W_RCVRY_ASST Prior collision with a recovery 
asset to damage plenum bolts 
    1.00E-01   ENGINE_STALL Engine stalls 
    1.00E+00   GENERATOR_DISABLED_WATE
R 
Water intrusion disables 
generator. NOTE: This should 
be updated with probability of 
water intrusion for missing bolts 
    1.00E-01   MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
    1.00E-01   PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
    1.00E-01   PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During preops, unsecured 




7. Step 6: Programmatic Decision on Risk Acceptance 
This step is a management decision point on whether to accept the risk and seek 
formal acceptance per MIL-STD-882E or to direct resources to mitigate the risk. The 
details of such a decision can vary from organization to organization. The programmatic 
decision will be based on a specific organizational matrix weighing the value of the 
capability provided from the asset as is, the probability and severity of a mishap occurring, 
and the cost of fixing or mitigating the risk. The specifics of an organization’s decision 
matrix are beyond the scope of this research. However, the implications of the identified 
risk will be briefly discussed here as it pertains to the organization’s decision. 
B. SUMMARY 
As previously stated, the program office for AAV currently is aware of several 
hazards contributing to the sinking of the vehicle that have been previously accepted. These 
hazards are all assessed as 1E (catastrophic/remote) risks per MIL-STD-882E, meaning 
there is potential for loss of life with a probability less than 9.90E-7. Recall from above 
discussion that these risks were identified primarily from analysis techniques that focused 
on single-point failures with little to no consideration for the human element of the system. 
Thus, it is possible that a misleadingly low probability of a mishap being reported 
compared to the realized mishaps that are being observed in the AAV fleet. The results 
from the PRA conducted on the aforementioned mishaps provide a quantitative assessment 
of the chain of events that was specific to the operation of the system as designed that were 
not previously captured or acknowledged. Table 4 presents the specific probability in 
relation to the cut sets leading to the unwanted event of sinking an AAV as observed within 
the mishap reports. Note that this assessment is for demonstrational purposes only and the 
probabilities reported are intentionally and explicitly not accurate with reality. 
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Table 4.   Mishap Probability Summary 
Mishap Cut Set Probability MIL-STD-882E 
Probability 
Category 
#1  9.15E-02 B 
#2  2.6472E-06 D 
#3  2.09952E-06 D 
#4  3.02E-04 D 
 
Assuming the calculated probabilities are accepted to be within the acceptable order 
of magnitude and severity is accepted as catastrophic as is routinely acknowledged as the 
credible consequence of loss of life for mishaps related to sinking of a vehicle, these risks 
would be categorized as 1B, 1D, 1D, 1D respectively per MIL-STD-882E. These risks 
would then in turn be subjected to the same weighted organizational matrix based on value 
of the capability provided by the system as currently designed, the probability and severity 
of a mishap occurring, and the cost of fixing or mitigating the risk.   
The decomposition of realized mishaps and the subsequent PRA of these mishaps 
suggest a greater probability of the mishaps that result in the sinking an AAV than 
previously acknowledged. Additionally, if this risk is deemed unacceptable, this 
quantitative assessment has identified high-risk events that program managers and systems 
engineers can focus resources to in support of improving safety. 
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V. DISCUSSION 
The method proposed and demonstrated above shows that there is a potentially 
significant difference between the acknowledged probability of potential mishaps and the 
quantified probability of actualized mishaps reported on AAVs. This is largely due to 
current focus of MIL-STD-882E on single failure events and the way the human element 
is ignored within the system during the safety assessment. The probability of a single-point 
failure leading to a sinking mishap is designed to be improbable within the system. 
However, as demonstrated by historical mishaps and the proposed method, the culmination 
of several failures linked in a sequence of causal factors has a considerably higher 
probability of leading to a mishap. When the human failure probability is included in the 
equation that probability increases further. The current approach in MIL-STD-882E can 
lead program managers to unwittingly expose the warfighter to a system that is not as safe 
as managers believe. The method proposed in this research presents a more accurate and 
quantifiable probability of a mishap that decision makers can take action to address rather 
than ignore.   
This method could be applied to a system anywhere in the systems engineering 
design process if there is sufficient data to construct applicable mishap scenario models. 
For example, operational concepts, architectural views, and historical data on similar in-
service systems can be utilized to develop preliminary mishap scenario models for a 
developmental system. The fidelity of the mishap scenario models will increase as the 
system architecture is defined and the product baseline is developed, thus allowing the 
method to be applied through the design phase. Early implementation of this method will 
allow stakeholders to focus resources in support of improving the safety of their system 
while still in the design phase. 
Once the proposed method is implemented, the results must be captured and 
reported in such a manner that allows program managers and system engineers to address 
the mishap. The current focus on hazards within MIL-STD-882E drives the reporting of 
risks in relation to the probability of a single failure event leading to a mishap. This is a 
singular relationship that does not include the sequence of failure events that often leads to 
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a mishap as illustrated in real-world mishap reports. An inclusive holistic approach of 
reporting the probability of the mishap occurring regardless of the complexity of its failure 
event chain must be included. The cut sets produced from the application are a key element 
in creating an all-inclusive risk reporting approach.   The cut sets capture all of the parallel 
pathways that can lead to the mishap and each cut set is a specific sequence of failure events 
leading to the mishap. These cut sets can be identified, reported, and tracked within the 
parameters of MIL-STD-882E HTS. 
There are noted limitations with the proposed method, notably with the utilization 
of the NARA generic task list for determining the human error probability. In an ideal 
situation, resources would be tasked to further quantify the probability of human failure 
probability specific to the AAV community. However, there may also be cultural impacts 
within that same community dependent on command climate and leadership that could 
create variation between different groups of AAV users. While the utilization of the NARA 
generic task list probabilities satisfies its purpose in this research for demonstrational 
purposes, it is believed to only be within an order of magnitude of reality. The use of the 
NARA task list probabilities may be optimistic in comparison to a specific HRA for the 
AAV community considering the vast difference between a military occupation specialty 
and nuclear reactor personnel, and their operating environments.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The risks associated with the equipment provided to the warfighter are often 
articulated and acknowledged quite differently from the risks realized during operation. 
MIL-STD-882E focuses on single-point failures but does not generally include failure 
modes that require sequential failure events to occur. However, this approach ignores the 
realization of mishaps from multiple system failure events to include the human events. 
This situation presents the risk of a mishap occurring much lower than as observed with 
the AAV fleet. For example, the current risk assessment methodology from MIL-STD-
882E identifies the probability of sinking an AAV as improbable, despite the fact that 
several vehicles have been sunk during the course of their operation. 
Real world AAV mishaps were analyzed to identify failure events, casual factors, 
root causes, and trends that lead to the mishaps occurring. Various risk assessment 
methodologies were reviewed and the PRA method of risk assessment was selected for use 
because it showed the most potential in correcting the deficiency between the 
acknowledged risk and the actual risk as observed from AAV operations. The development 
of a PRA- based method specific to the operational scenarios of the AAV system and the 
decomposed mishap reports allowed the observed risk to be accurately quantified and 
reported. The proposed method demonstrates that there is a potentially significant 
difference between the acknowledged probability of potential mishaps and the quantified 
probability of actualized mishaps reported. This is largely due to the current focus on single 
failure events and the way the human failure probability is ignored within the system.   
The implementation of this method will more accurately inform stakeholders of the 
current risks of their equipment as designed and operated, and allows stakeholders to focus 
resources in support of improving the safety of their system.   
There are several areas of future work that should be considered in regards to this 
research. In addition to a specific HRA directly applicable to the AAV, more detailed 
probabilistic assessments will be embedded into the method. Once the quantification of the 
HRA aspect of the proposed method is refined, this methodology should be applied across 
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the full operational profile of the AAV. Subsequently, there are plans to apply this method 
to the next generation amphibious vehicle.  
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APPENDIX A.  MISHAP #1 
A. MISHAP #1 DECOMPOSITION 
The following is an example of the decomposition of mishap #1 utilizing the 
approach described earlier.  
Est 0730–0800 pre-water operations check conducted on mishap vehicle the driver 
and crew chief.  
Est 0850 vehicle commander reports to platoon Sgt that VEH#1 was prepared to 
launch. Platoon Sgt collects pre-water operations checklist/manifests and conducts water 
integrity check of all vehicles. VEH#1 three-member crew occupies the following stations: 
vehicle commander in turret, crew chief in Troop commander’s (TC) station, driver in the 
driver’s station. 
Est 0855 on board VEH#1 vehicle commander directs driver to change mode 
selector switch from land mode to water/jets mode. 
OD)2) Crew chiefs, platoon sergeants, platoon commanders do not ensure the 
drivers employ the bow plane each time the AAV is waterborne in accordance with 
operator’s manual TM 09674A-10/3. Interviews with driver, crew chief, platoon sergeant, 
and platoon commander indicated that deploying bow planes are up to individual 
preference and its use is not universally accepted among AAV supervisors. 
0900 vehicles begin launch. 
Est 0902 VEH#1 prepares to launch, driver places gear selector in first gear, 
releases brake, gets green flag, fully depresses accelerator pedal, VEH#1 splashes and 
surfaces uneventfully. 
Est 0903 (the following sequence of events occur within an estimated 45 seconds 
onboard VEH#1) 
-Driver turns on electric bilge pumps, 
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-Driver places vehicle gear selector in neutral position while accelerator pedal is 
completely depressed 
-Driver pushes hand throttle all the way forward and removes foot from accelerator 
pedal. 
O1)A) Operator’s Manual TM 09674a-10/3 Assault Amphibious Vehicle lacks 
guidance on use of hand throttle control 
OA1) supervisory/training - driver was unfamiliar with the safe waterborne 
operation of an AAV. The driver was never trained in the use of the hand throttle in 
waterborne operations, had never used it to move an AAV but chose to use the hand throttle 
to control the speed of VEH#1 once waterborne 
-Driver unlocks and opens his hatch, stands on driver’s seat, turns body in a 
clockwise direction until facing aft in an attempt to secure his hatch in the open position. 
Vehicle commander and crew chief facing aft locking their hatches simultaneously with 
driver. 
O2)C) 2D AA BN Order P3000.2d Standard Operating Procedures for AAV 
Operations lacks guidance on when to safely open hatches when AAV becomes 
waterborne. 
01)B) Operator’s Manual TM 09674a-10/3 Assault Amphibious Vehicle lacks 
guidance on when to safely open hatches when an AAV is waterborne and not employing 
the bow plane. The following paragraph is an excerpt from the Assault Amphibian School 
student handout on driving in water. (This handout is dated Jan 92 and references tm 
07007b-10 which is now replaced by TM 09674A-10/3). “Without the bow plane 
modification, an empty AAVP7A1 assumes a nose-down attitude which is aggravated as 
water speed increases. When engine speed exceeds xxxx rpms, the situation becomes 
critical and all hatches must be closed to prevent an excessive amount of water from 
entering the vehicle. After the hatches are closed, the nose-down attitude causes water to 
pour over the vision blocks obscuring the driver’s visibility and diminishing his ability to 
operate the vehicle. To regain visibility the driver must significantly reduce the vehicles 
forward speed. When the bow Plane is extended (raised), this prevents the vehicle from 
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assuming the bow-down attitude allowing the driver and others a better operational field 
of vision. In higher sea states the bow plane effectiveness increases” (USMC 2012). 
-At this time driver experiences difficulty in securing hatch due to missing driver’s 
hatch support. 
OH1) Driver’s hatch support which stops the hatch from impacting the rear plenum 
and aligns hatch and locking notch in the fully open position was missing from VEH#1. If 
hatch support was in place driver would not have spent 3–4 seconds attempting to secure 
his hatch in fully open position. 
-Vehicle commander turns forward and notices water up to driver’s hatch and warns 
via intercom that driver is about to get wet. 
-Driver turns forward just as water begins rushing into driver’s hatch 
-Driver turns counterclockwise and throws hands in the air, faces towards crew 
chief in TC with a look of panic and Confusion. 
-Vehicle commander directs driver via intercom to pull the hand throttle back. 
-Upon hearing vehicle commander’s direction crew chief drops down his hatch to 
the interior of VEH#1 and moves forward in an attempt to reach the hand throttle but is 
unsuccessful due to the volume of water rushing in through driver’s hatch. 
-While climbing out of the TC hatch, crew chief hears vehicle commander 
frantically shout to kill the fuel, shut it down via intercom. 
-Crew chief exits TC hatch moves forward arriving adjacent to drivers hatch in an 
attempt to reach hand throttle from the top but this was also unsuccessful because the 
driver’s hatch was now submerged below the water line as the vehicle was submerging 
with a heavy forward port list. 
-VEH#1 submerges completely 
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B. MISHAP #1 MISHAP SCENARIO MODEL 
 
Figure 8.  Mishap #2 Scenario
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C. MISHAP #1 FAILURE MODES 
 
Figure 9.  Operation—Water Rushes in through Open Hatch 
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APPENDIX B.  MISHAP #2 DECOMPOSITION 
The following is an example of the decomposition of mishap #2 utilizing the 
approach described earlier. 
P173. Vehicle (VEH) #1’s pre-water operations checklist was not filled in on page 
I-4, which included battery volt indicator readings. 
P174. VEH #1’s pre-water operation checklist has the VC’s initials next to the 
inspection line indicating that the exhaust grill lugs were serviceable without remarks and 
the VC claims to have personally inspected both lugs.  
O3. VC did not check the rear exhaust locking lugs during the pre-water operations 
checks on 20 April 2009. The pre-water operations checklist was inaccurately recorded by 
the VC regarding the status of the exhaust grill locking lugs.  
R118. The recovery divers confirmed the forward plenum lock indicator 
“Mushroom” was in the closed and locked position, the forward plenum dogs were closed, 
but not entirely into the fully locked position prior to recovery. 
P175. VEH #1’s pre-water operations checklist has the VC’s initials next to the 
inspection line indicating that the heater exhaust outlet was closed and that the VC claims 
to have personally inspected the heater exhaust outlet.  
R122.g. The Troop Heater vent was in an unlocked and open position. 
O6. The VC did not secure the personnel heater vent during the pre-water 
operations checks and the pre-water operations checklist was inaccurately recorded by the 
VC regarding the status of the personnel heater vent. 
E8. As VEH #1 first touched the stern gate of the ship, the engine quit and VEH #1 
went dead in the water. 
E13. Immediate attempts by the driver to restart VEH #1 failed. 
E14. The battery bank was quickly tested by the CC and showed approximately 
15.7 volts, well below that required to turn over the engine and restart VEH #1.  
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O12. The cause of the engine failure cannot be proven, but the inability to restart 
the engine was a function of a discharged battery bank.  
O13. The cause of the discharged battery bank was most likely the result of a 
generator that was not providing enough power to the vehicle during the initial transit from 
the beach to the ship.  
O14. The cause of the generator failure cannot be proven. Failure of the crew to 
properly secure the plenum housing and exhaust grill could have caused excessive leaking 
from waves and wind during the transit that dripped down onto the generator. However, 
the failure rate of that particular generator series and the history of electrical problems with 
that particular vehicle also provide a reasonably likely cause for the generator failure. 
E15. When the engine quit, the mechanical bilge pumps ceased functioning, and 
the capacity for VEH #1 to pump out water was reduced. 
O10. The electric bilge pumps were virtually ineffective after the initial loss of 
engine power. The combination of CC’s testimony that he could not hear them operating 
as he normally could along with the very low voltage readings taken immediately after the 
engine died are strong indicators.  
E20. After the engine quit, VEH #1 rotated 90 degrees counterclockwise and 
floated into the well deck with the starboard track in the well deck and the port track over 
the stern gate.  
E21. Over the next 5–10 minutes, the wave action in the well deck moved VEH #1 
at first toward the starboard side of the well deck without contact, and then to the port side 
and aft off the port quarter. 
E22. The crew of VEH #1 felt jarring and impact with the ship but could not locate 
what it was hitting because the hatches were closed and they were working internally to 
the vehicle to trouble shoot restarting the engine.  
R122.e. The starboard forward bilge outlet cover/ballistic cover assembly missing 
as well as damage to the armor plating mounting hardware near the bilge outlet. 
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O8. The starboard electric bilge outlet cover and the adjacent armor was damaged 
sometime after splashing, and before coming to rest on the ocean floor. It is inconceivable 
that the crew/section leader/splash team leader would have missed this damage in checking 
the bilge outlets as part of the pre-water operations checks, and there is no evidence that it 
was damaged by the divers or by the careful recovery.  
O9. The most likely cause of damage to the starboard electrical bilge outlet and 
adjacent armor was rubbing on the stern of the ship by wave action in the well deck. The 
height of the stern gate dogs matches with height of the bilge outlet with VEH #1 under 
the wave action associated with the free surface effect of the well deck and could have 
easily “clipped” the ballistic cover of the bilge outlet. The stern gate corner could also have 
smashed the armor around the bilge outlet if not the bilge outlet itself. All witness saw 
VEH #1 getting bounced around in the well deck and as she floated out. Since no one was 
in position to see the actual impact, there is no testimony to prove this, but there is no 
otherwise reasonable explanation. 
E39. The platoon sergeant made the decision to turn away VEH #2’s first attempt 
to tow VEH #1 into the well deck because depth of water at the sill was only 4 feet, which 
was within the standard operating procedure (SOP) for both the ship and the AAV for 
regular recovery but was outside both Dock Landing Ship (LSD) and AAV SOP for 
recovery of a towed AAV.  
E62. In the last 2–3 minutes as VEH #1 closes the 150–200m under tow to the 
ship’s stern, the water level rises sharply. 
E64. VEH #1 was riding noticeably lower in the water.  
O15. The larger than normal intake of water (for the 35 minutes from the engine 
quitting until VEH #1’s final approach was a combination of the standard leakage rate plus 
wave and wind water lapping into the exposed starboard electric bilge outlet, the holes 
from the missing bolts on the plenum housing and cargo hatch, and water leaking from the 
exhaust grill and plenum housing that was not properly secured.  
O16. That the decisive moment occurred as VEH #2 turned for final approach and 
began towing VEH #1 into the wind and seas toward LSD. Seconds after turning toward 
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the ship, the starboard bilge drain submerged as a function of both the increased draft from 
the sea water taken on over the last 35 minutes, and the increased pressure on the bow from 
both wind and seas. Additionally, the strain of the tow lines several feet above the center 
of balance naturally created a bias toward a bow down tow.  
E76. That as VEH #2 made contact with the stern gate and reached the sill a large 
wave hit VEH #1 and the first tow line parted.  
E78. That VEH #2 was pulled backward slightly down the stern gate and within 
seconds the second tow line parted.  
E79. That VEH #1 was well aft of the aft edge of the stern gate when both tow lines 
parted.  
E80. That the bow of VEH #1 continued to rotate downward, and within 3–5 
seconds the entire vehicle had submerged. The rapid timeline suggesting significant 
additional breaches of water tight integrity. 
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APPENDIX C.  MISHAP #3 
A. MISHAP #3 DECOMPOSITION 
The following is an example of the decomposition of mishap #3 utilizing the 
approach described earlier. 
M44. That VEH#1 was received by Assault Amphibian Schools Battalion on 3 Jan 
2008.  
M45. That the VEH#1 logbook did not show any hydraulic fluid loss since Jan 
2010.  
M46. That VEH#1 received an Annual Maintenance Inspection on 14 Sept 2009 
that detected no discrepancies related to the plenum or hydraulic systems.  
M47. That VEH#1 received a Semi-Annual Maintenance Inspection on 16 Mar 
2010 that noted a hydro leak in the exhaust plenum.  
M48. That VEH#1’s exhaust Cam Lock was replaced on 3 Mar 2010.  
M49. That a hydraulic leak in the plenums was repaired on 7 Jun 2010.  
M50. That prior to going to the field the Sgt#2 believed the plenums worked 
correctly. 
E8. That the Splash Team consisted of Sgt#3, Sgt#4, and SSgt#2.  
E9. That a Pre-Water Operations Checklist was completed on VEH#1 as described 
in ref (d), prior to splashing into the ocean.  
O2. That Pre-Water Operation Checklist and Splash Team Inspection procedures 
were followed as required in references (b) and (d). 
E10. That the Splash Team inspected VEH#1 prior to launch and was found to be 
fully functional and watertight as described in ref (b).  
E11. That the front plenum mushroom was up, indicating a closed intake plenum 
door, during both the Pre-Water Op and the Splash Team inspection.  
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T39. That when the plenum cylinder is fully extended but the cam lock is not 
mechanically locked, the mushroom is raised. 
R26. That the MDSU1 photographs showed the front mushroom was down, 
indicating an open intake plenum door. 
T37. That when the front plenum was raised the plenum door was open.  
T38. That on 17 Jun 2010 the forward plenum of VEH#1 was tested by hooking it 
up to the hydraulic system of another AAV. The cylinder retracted and extended normally 
but the plenum doors did not mechanically lock. The test was repeated numerous times but 
the intake plenum cam lock never engaged. 
T40. That on 17 Jun 2010 while testing the forward plenums, a hydraulic leak was 
detected on the rear plenum feed line. 
O1. That VEH#1 sank due to rapid flooding caused by the intake plenum door 
opening in the surf zone. The plenum door opened due to the intake plenum door not being 
mechanically locked into place combined with a hydraulic leak from the rear plenum feed 
line. 
E2. That the Sgt#1 was the crew chief of VEH#1 on the morning of 11 June and 
positioned in the Troop Commander seat when VEH#1 splashed.  
E4. That PFC#1 was the driver of VEH#1 on the morning of 11 June.  
E12. That VEH#1 took on water rapidly while nearing the end of the surf zone.  
E14. That VEH#1 took a nose down angle and sank at the edge of the surf zone 
approximately 2–3 minutes after splashing.  
E15. That Sgt#1 ordered the crew to escape as VEH#1 began to submerge.  
E1. That VEH#1 sank during basic water training at approximately 0845, 11 June 
2010 at approximate location MGRS 11S MS 580 811. 
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B. MISHAP #3 MISHAP SCENARIO MODEL 
 
Figure 11.  Mishap #3 Scenario
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C. MISHAP #3 FAILURE MODES 
 
Figure 12.  Maintenance—Hydraulic Leak Plenum 
 
Figure 13.  Pre-water Ops—Plenum 
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Figure 14.  Mishap #3 Event Tree.
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APPENDIX D.  MISHAP #4 
A. MISHAP #4 DECOMPOSITION 
The following is an example of the decomposition of mishap #4 utilizing the 
approach described earlier. 
M10. A sticking throttle pedal on VEH#1 was first identified as early as late 
October 2010, but not reported by Sgt#1 the assigned crew chief.  
M13. PMCS was conducted Monday, 10 January as per the detailed training 
schedule. 
M17. Deadlining discrepancies for VEH#1 were annotated on the open ERO during 
the weekly MMO maintenance reconciliation on 11 January 2011 but were not formally 
identified as deadlining.  
M18. A Limited Technical Inspection (LTI) was conducted on VEH#1 in 
conjunction with the Semi-Annual Service on 11 January 2011.  
M19. In conjunction with the Semi-Annual service, a Communications LTI was 
conducted on VEH#1’s communication suite on 11 January 2011. The inter-
communication system was deemed functional.  
M21. Deadlining discrepancies were annotated on semi-annual service on 11 
January 2011 but were not identified as deadlining discrepancies.  
M23. Sgt#2 knowingly falsified VEH#1’s pre-operational check sheet, on 11 
January 2011, for operations to be conducted two days later, on 13 January 2011; 
specifically block 5–1 vehicle internal communications.  
M32. Although parts for deadlining discrepancies were on hand, the discrepancies 
annotated on the Semi-Annual service and maintenance reconciliation ERO, were not 
repaired prior to 13 January 2011.  
M34. Sgt#3 repaired VEH#1’s Lock-out linkage on 13 January 2011 after the land 
driving portion. This was identified to him by Sgt#2 as a sluggish engine. He found the 
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lock-out linkage disconnected and reconnected it. The repair was not directed to the 
sticking throttle pedal. Sgt#2’s Testimony “it didn’t feel like it wasn’t getting enough 
power, it wasn’t getting enough gas. When I was driving around, it felt like it was running 
a little sluggish.” 
M35. Although not part of a pre-operational check list, VEH#1’s throttle pedal was 
operating in a degraded status (sticking) on 13 January 2011 during the land driving portion 
of the POI and was accepted by Sgt#2 as operational. Sgt#2’s Testimony wasn’t necessarily 
worried about the sticking of the throttle pedal, “I was more worried about the sluggishness 
of the vehicle.” 
P36. Intercom communications were not established in the vehicle Commander’s 
position (turret) or rear crewman stations on 13 January 2011. Intercom Communications 
only existed between the Driver and the Troop Commander’s station on 13 January 2011.  
P38. The instructor crew on board VEH#1 did not report the degraded status of the 
vehicle’s sticking throttle pedal or lack of intercom communications capability from the 
turret or rear crewman positions to the appropriate Maintenance personnel or Chain of 
Command on 13 January 2011. 
P50. Sgt#4 was the crew chief of VEH#1 and signed the Pre-operations checklist 
on 14 January 2011. 
P53. Sgt#4 signed VEH#1’s pre-operations check sheet, for water operations, 
specifically block 18 vehicle internal communications as serviceable although no 
communication in the turret or rear crewman station were established.  
P55. Each student who operated VEH#1 was briefed to the fact that the throttle 
pedal on VEH#1 was sticking, and they were briefed (informal training) on how to apply 
the heal toe method for manipulating the throttle pedal in order to manually correct the 
sticking throttle pedal.  
P56. The instructor crew on board VEH#1 did not report the degraded status of the 
vehicle’s sticking throttle pedal or the lack of intercom communications capability from 
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the turret or rear crewman positions to the appropriate Maintenance personnel or Chain of 
Command on 14 January 2011.  
The Sinking 
E64. The crew actions from the splash of VEH#1 through the conduct of the water 
driving course to the surfacing of the Marines are listed in sequence below.  
• Splash procedures were conducted prior to launch. 
• PVT#1 receives instruction to place the vehicle in 2nd gear from Sgt#5. 
• PVT#1 begins moving vehicle down the ramp of the west rain room. 
• The vehicle hits the water and begins floating. 
• PVT#1 places the gear selector into the neutral position. 
• Sgt#5 instructs PVT#1 to open his hatch. 
• Sgt#5 instructs PVT#1 to drive straight out from the rain room for an 
unknown distance and to cross steer the vehicle. 
• Sgt#5 instructs PVT#1 to conduct a port 360-degree turn. 
• As the port 360-degree turn is completed, Sgt#5 instructs PVT#1 to drive 
towards the School house, while cross steering. 
• PVT#1 starts driving towards the School house while cross steering. 
• At some point, PVT#1 stops cross steering. 
• Sgt#5 notices water level starting to rise over the bow of the vehicle and 
instructs PVT#1 to let off the throttle and to keep cross steering. 
• Water rises to the point at which it starts to flow into the driver’s hatch. 
• Sgt#5 begins to yell louder at PVT#1 to get the throttle unstuck or turn off 
the fuel lever. 
• PVT#1 attempts to kick the throttle pedal. Engine RPM’s remain high. 
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• Sgt#2 squats down in the turret and yells to Sgt#4 to get students to a hatch 
and shut off the fuel lever. 
• PVT#1 stands up, turns 45 degrees and looks at Sgt#5. Sgt#5’s testimony 
“At that point, PVR#1 stood up and did about a half body turn and turned 
his head all the way around and looked at me with a look of sheer terror.” 
• PVT#1 becomes unresponsive to Sgt#5’s commands. 
• Water begins pouring in driver’s hatch. 
• Sgt#2 raises back up and sees driver’s station completely under water. 
• Vehicle submerges. 
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B. MISHAP #4 MISHAP SCENARIO MODEL 
 
Figure 15.  Mishap #4 Scenario.
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C. MISHAP #4 FAILURE MODES 
 
Figure 16.  Operation—Water Rushes in through Open Hatch
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Figure 17.  Mishap #4 Event Tree.
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APPENDIX E.  MISHAP #2 CUT SET—SAPHIRE DATA 
 
# Cases Prob/Freq Total % Cut Sets  
  1.233E-7 100 Displaying 16 Cut Sets. (16 Original)  
1 C 1.000E-7 81.07 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-1  ENGINE_STALL Engine stalls 
  1.000E-1  GENERATOR_DISABLED_WATE
R 
Water intrusion disables 
generator. NOTE: This should 
be updated with probability of 
water intrusion for missing bolts 
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
  1.000E-2  OTHER_PLENUM_BOLT_FAILU
R 
Other reasons for plenum bolts 
failing or missing 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
2 C 1.000E-8 8.11 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-3  COLLISION_W_RCVRY_ASST Prior collision with a recovery 
asset to damage plenum bolts 
  1.000E-1  ENGINE_STALL Engine stalls 
  1.000E-1  GENERATOR_DISABLED_WATE
R 
Water intrusion disables 
generator. NOTE: This should 
be updated with probability of 
water intrusion for missing bolts 
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
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# Cases Prob/Freq Total % Cut Sets  
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
3 C 1.000E-8 8.11 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-1  ENGINE_STALL Engine stalls 
  1.000E-2  GENERATOR_DISABLED_OTHE
R 
Other reasons for the generator 
being disabled 
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
  1.000E-2  OTHER_PLENUM_BOLT_FAILU
R 
Other reasons for plenum bolts 
failing or missing 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
4 C 1.000E-9 0.81 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-3  COLLISION_W_RCVRY_ASST Prior collision with a recovery 
asset to damage plenum bolts 
  1.000E-1  ENGINE_STALL Engine stalls 
  1.000E-2  GENERATOR_DISABLED_OTHE
R 
Other reasons for the generator 
being disabled 
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
5 C 1.000E-9 0.81 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-1  GENERATOR_DISABLED_WATE
R 
Water intrusion disables 
generator. NOTE: This should 
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be updated with probability of 
water intrusion for missing bolts 
  1.000E-3  HYDRAULIC_BILGE_OTHER Other reasons for losing 
hydraulic bilge 
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
  1.000E-2  OTHER_PLENUM_BOLT_FAILU
R 
Other reasons for plenum bolts 
failing or missing 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
6 C 1.000E-9 0.81 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-1  ENGINE_STALL Engine stalls 
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
  1.000E-2  OTHER_PLENUM_BOLT_FAILU
R 
Other reasons for plenum bolts 
failing or missing 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
  1.000E-3  VEHICLE_BATTERIES_OTHER Other reason for vehicle 
batteries discharging 
7 C 1.000E-10 0.08 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-3  COLLISION_W_RCVRY_ASST Prior collision with a recovery 
asset to damage plenum bolts 
  1.000E-1  GENERATOR_DISABLED_WATE
R 
Water intrusion disables 
generator. NOTE: This should 
be updated with probability of 
water intrusion for missing bolts 
  1.000E-3  HYDRAULIC_BILGE_OTHER Other reasons for losing 
hydraulic bilge 
 68 
# Cases Prob/Freq Total % Cut Sets  
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
8 C 1.000E-10 0.08 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-3  COLLISION_W_RCVRY_ASST Prior collision with a recovery 
asset to damage plenum bolts 
  1.000E-1  ENGINE_STALL Engine stalls 
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
  1.000E-3  VEHICLE_BATTERIES_OTHER Other reason for vehicle 
batteries discharging 
9 C 1.000E-10 0.08 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-2  GENERATOR_DISABLED_OTHE
R 
Other reasons for the generator 
being disabled 
  1.000E-3  HYDRAULIC_BILGE_OTHER Other reasons for losing 
hydraulic bilge 
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
  1.000E-2  OTHER_PLENUM_BOLT_FAILU
R 
Other reasons for plenum bolts 
failing or missing 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
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10 C 1.000E-11 < 0.01 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-2  ENGINE_RESTART_OTHER Other reasons for engine not 
restarting successfully 
  1.000E-1  ENGINE_STALL Engine stalls 
  1.000E-3  LOSS_OF_ELEC_BILGE_OTHER Other reasons for losing the 
electric bilge 
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
  1.000E-2  OTHER_PLENUM_BOLT_FAILU
R 
Other reasons for plenum bolts 
failing or missing 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
11 C 1.000E-11 < 0.01 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-3  COLLISION_W_RCVRY_ASST Prior collision with a recovery 
asset to damage plenum bolts 
  1.000E-2  GENERATOR_DISABLED_OTHE
R 
Other reasons for the generator 
being disabled 
  1.000E-3  HYDRAULIC_BILGE_OTHER Other reasons for losing 
hydraulic bilge 
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
12 C 1.000E-11 < 0.01 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-3  HYDRAULIC_BILGE_OTHER Other reasons for losing 
hydraulic bilge 
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  1.000E-3  LOSS_OF_ELEC_BILGE_OTHER Other reasons for losing the 
electric bilge 
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
  1.000E-2  OTHER_PLENUM_BOLT_FAILU
R 
Other reasons for plenum bolts 
failing or missing 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
13 C 1.000E-11 < 0.01 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-3  HYDRAULIC_BILGE_OTHER Other reasons for losing 
hydraulic bilge 
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
  1.000E-2  OTHER_PLENUM_BOLT_FAILU
R 
Other reasons for plenum bolts 
failing or missing 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During preops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
  1.000E-3  VEHICLE_BATTERIES_OTHER Other reason for vehicle 
batteries discharging 
14 C 1.000E-12 < 0.01 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-3  COLLISION_W_RCVRY_ASST Prior collision with a recovery 
asset to damage plenum bolts 
  1.000E-3  HYDRAULIC_BILGE_OTHER Other reasons for losing 
hydraulic bilge 
  1.000E-3  LOSS_OF_ELEC_BILGE_OTHER Other reasons for losing the 
electric bilge 
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
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  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During pre-ops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During pre-ops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
15 C 1.000E-12 < 0.01 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-3  COLLISION_W_RCVRY_ASST Prior collision with a recovery 
asset to damage plenum bolts 
  1.000E-3  HYDRAULIC_BILGE_OTHER Other reasons for losing 
hydraulic bilge 
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During pre-ops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During pre-ops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
  1.000E-3  VEHICLE_BATTERIES_OTHER Other reason for vehicle 
batteries discharging 
16 C 1.000E-12 < 0.01 MISHAP_2: 4  
  1.000E+0  SPLASH Vehicle enters the water (either 
from ship or shore) 
  1.000E-3  COLLISION_W_RCVRY_ASST Prior collision with a recovery 
asset to damage plenum bolts 
  1.000E-2  ENGINE_RESTART_OTHER Other reasons for engine not 
restarting successfully 
  1.000E-1  ENGINE_STALL Engine stalls 
  1.000E-3  LOSS_OF_ELEC_BILGE_OTHER Other reasons for losing the 
electric bilge 
  1.000E-1  MAINT_MISSING_BOLT_UNIDE Maintenance does not identify 
missing or damaged bolts 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_SL During pre-ops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the section leader 
  1.000E-1  PREOPS_UNSECURED_VC During pre-ops, unsecured 
plenum door not identified by 
the VC 
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